Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

attitude to how nuclear weapons will figure in overall
<strong>NATO</strong> strategy, <strong>and</strong> indeed on how that strategy itself
evolves.
More broadly, the tenor of debate over <strong>NATO</strong> as
a whole has been shifting in ways that will affect the
attitude in Europe towards the nuclear element of Alliance
policy. First, there has been the reopening of the
debate over burden-sharing more generally, not just
nuclear, <strong>and</strong> especially the perception in Washington
of European shirking. This was highlighted most publicly
by the scolding parting shots of the then outgoing
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates. 7 Europe might
respond positively to some of the criticism. But beyond
renewed efforts to make “smart procurement”
<strong>and</strong> the pooling of resources genuinely work better,
there is no chance of Europe collectively—in the current
circumstances—increasing the resources that it
devotes to defense. Quite the reverse, in fact. Against
that background of transatlantic frictions, added to
even more pressure on European conventional capabilities,
the arguments over the nuclear umbrella as
an ultimate guarantor of security—<strong>and</strong> the place of
forward-deployed TNWs as a part of that—could be
significantly affected.
Then there is Libya. The outcome (inasmuch as it
is yet possible to be definitive about it) has been portrayed
as a success story for the Alliance, <strong>and</strong> more
particularly for the leading European members of it.
There were indeed significant <strong>and</strong> impressive military
capabilities deployed that were ultimately applied
successfully. The politics of it seemed to work as well,
in the sense that the Alliance agreed collectively to
take on comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control of the mission. But it
was not, despite its code name Operation UNIFIED
PROTECTOR, an entirely united effort in terms of the
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