Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

strengthening of first-strike stability as an objective of
strategic arms control. Like previous bilateral nuclear
treaties, the main focus of the New START is the limitation
of ballistic missiles <strong>and</strong> warheads deployed on
these missiles. Because of this concern, the Treaty undercounts
warheads deployed on strategic bombers,
each of which is assumed (for treaty purposes) to be
deployed with only a single warhead. This asymmetry
in counting rules makes sense if one’s objective is
to focus restrictions on those systems—ballistic missiles—that
are most suited to a disarming first strike.
Were a successor treaty to focus on total warhead
numbers, however, one stockpiled nuclear artillery
shell would count as much as one warhead deployed
on a long-range missile. This may make sense from a
U.S. point of view. Given trends in Russian forces, together
with the relative invulnerability of U.S. ballistic
missile submarines, the United States can be relatively
comfortable about its forces’ ability to survive a first
strike, even at much lower numbers. But Russian decisionmakers
may be less sanguine, especially when
account is also taken of growing U.S. conventional
capabilities for long-range strike <strong>and</strong> ballistic missile
defense.
Second, the assumption that NSNWs would be included
in a legally binding treaty brings other problems.
It is possible that the next few years could see
some mutual reductions in the systems limited by the
New START Treaty, with budgetary pressures providing
an incentive for reductions in missile numbers
in particular. In return for a further round of legally
binding reductions in offensive forces, however, Russia
seems certain to seek assurances on future U.S. deployments
of strategic missile defense systems. Yet it
is difficult to imagine the U.S. Senate being willing to
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