Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

still making a substantial contribution to wider security
objectives.
That being said, it may still be possible to achieve
significant further reductions in U.S. <strong>and</strong> Russian strategic
arsenals within the framework of the existing
treaty. Both countries are currently planning to spend
significant amounts on modernizing their strategic
forces (including new missiles <strong>and</strong> submarines) over
the next 10-15 years. If some of this expenditure could
be reduced or postponed as a result of cuts below New
START ceilings (especially those for delivery vehicles),
leaders in both countries may have an opportunity to
make further mutual reductions, even without agreement
on a new treaty. By the end of the decade, it is
therefore possible that levels of both START-countable
deployed delivery vehicles <strong>and</strong> warheads (currently
700 <strong>and</strong> 1,550 respectively) could be reduced substantially.
The political plausibility <strong>and</strong> extent of such reductions
are likely to be greater, however, if they take
place in parallel with a process of mutual reductions
<strong>and</strong> increased transparency in NSNWs.
Further significant reductions in American <strong>and</strong>
Russian arsenals may also require some greater assurance
that other nuclear weapon states continue to
restrict their own arsenals at relatively low levels. The
position of China is likely to be of particular importance.
Given the concern that both the United States
<strong>and</strong> Russia have about how China’s growing power
might affect their own security, both countries—<strong>and</strong>
Russia in particular—will be nervous about removing
one of the components where they still retain a significant
edge.
As in the case of other nuclear weapon states, Chinese
steps towards greater transparency would be
more likely to contribute to confidence-building were
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