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Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

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slowly changing deterrence ethos was a politically<br />

irreversible move away from the stern nuclear warfighting<br />

assumpti<strong>on</strong>s of the 1950s.<br />

Hidden C<strong>on</strong>sequences of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nuclear</str<strong>on</strong>g> Disillusi<strong>on</strong> within<br />

the Warsaw Pact. There was no equivalent ferment<br />

within the Warsaw Pact, where all nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s<br />

were retained under the direct c<strong>on</strong>trol of KGB detachments,<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> where the nearest to an alliance debate<br />

was a single Czechoslovak request in 1983 for an unprecedented<br />

Warsaw Pact training schedule devoted<br />

to an actual Warsaw Pact defense—before practicing<br />

the inevitable counteroffensive in Exercise Shield 84. 91<br />

But there were slow, intangible, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> sometimes covert<br />

c<strong>on</strong>sequences for planning exchanges of weap<strong>on</strong>s as<br />

fateful as TNWs in such an atmosphere. The intensely<br />

risky offensive orientati<strong>on</strong> which Russian strategies<br />

imposed led to a demotivated <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> fatalistic view<br />

am<strong>on</strong>g minor Warsaw Pact allies, aware of the inevitable<br />

scale of losses in the scenarios for which they<br />

trained. One Polish officer in Warsaw Pact headquarters,<br />

Col<strong>on</strong>el Ryszard Kuklinski, became a defector-inplace<br />

(later called “the First Polish Officer in <str<strong>on</strong>g>NATO</str<strong>on</strong>g>”)<br />

partly because of his c<strong>on</strong>cern over the ruthless <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

entirely offensive nature of Warsaw Pact plans, which<br />

would unhesitatingly sacrifice Polish blood <strong>on</strong> “a Red<br />

Altar.” <str<strong>on</strong>g>NATO</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al inferiority would force<br />

it to resp<strong>on</strong>d to a Warsaw Pact invasi<strong>on</strong> with TNWs,<br />

which would leave Pol<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> a wastel<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g>. 92 To avert that<br />

future, he became an immensely valuable early western<br />

intelligence source <strong>on</strong> the strategy of deep operati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

which the Soviets began planning from the late<br />

1970s to mid-1980s. His revelati<strong>on</strong>s, al<strong>on</strong>g with those<br />

provided by the equally disillusi<strong>on</strong>ed Russian General<br />

Dmitri Polyakov, were crucial to <str<strong>on</strong>g>NATO</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s early<br />

recogniti<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> answer to that strategy. 93<br />

49

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