Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

mitted to the Alliance by Kuklinski <strong>and</strong> Polyakov by
1981. The subsequent <strong>NATO</strong> revolution in military affairs,
implemented through programs such as the Conventional
Defense Improvement Initiative (CDI) <strong>and</strong>
the Conceptual Military Framework (CMF), involved
the introduction of widespread precision-guided <strong>and</strong>
“assault breaker” bomblet munitions coordinated in
a “reconnaissance strike complex.” The U.S. AirL<strong>and</strong>
Battle concept adopted in 1981 involved integrated
conventional <strong>and</strong> nuclear air attacks on second <strong>and</strong>
third echelon targets. High-technology <strong>and</strong> improved
tactical concepts culminated in <strong>NATO</strong>’s non-nuclear
Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) concept adopted in
1985—“an intellectual framework in which the latest
American technology could be adapted to the realities
of European battlefield.” 102 FOFA’s expected effectiveness
very largely negated the Soviet conventional
option, thus introducing the necessity for agonizing
<strong>NATO</strong> ministerial decisions on when <strong>and</strong> whether to
employ TNWs. The newly arrived enhancements of
<strong>NATO</strong> forces were deliberately shown off to Warsaw
Pact observers in Exercises Bold Sparrow <strong>and</strong> Certain
Strike in 1987. 103 The case for large TNW numbers also
diminished as a result.
TNWs <strong>and</strong> the Able Archer Scare of 1983.
In notable contrast to the preceding years of détente,
President Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980, his
fierce anti-Communism, <strong>and</strong> the huge military buildup
that he initiated, led to sharply increased tensions
with the Soviet Union, which some observers at the
time labeled the Second Cold War. At the height of the
Euromissile crisis, the Soviet leadership began to fear
a surprise U.S. nuclear attack (code-named Ryan) to
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