Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

• Continue <strong>and</strong>, where appropriate, exp<strong>and</strong> consultations
with allies <strong>and</strong> partners to address
how to ensure the credibility <strong>and</strong> effectiveness
of the U.S. extended deterrent. No changes in
U.S. extended deterrence capabilities will be
made without close consultations with our allies
<strong>and</strong> partners.” 19
• “Conduct a full scope B-61 (nuclear bomb) Life
Extension <strong>Program</strong> to ensure its functionality
with the F-35 <strong>and</strong> to include making surety—
safety, security, <strong>and</strong> use control—enhancements
to maintain confidence in the B-61. These
decisions ensure that the United States will retain
the capability to forward deploy non-strategic
nuclear weapons in support of its Alliance
commitments.” 20
In addition to its forward-deployed tactical nuclear
forces, the United States has also relied on non-nuclear
elements to strengthen regional security architectures,
including a forward U.S. conventional presence <strong>and</strong>
effective theater ballistic missile defenses. The role of
those elements of extended deterrence, said the NPR,
will increase:
As the role of nuclear weapons is reduced in U.S. national
security strategy, these non-nuclear elements
will take on a greater share of the deterrence burden.
Moreover, an indispensable ingredient of effective
regional deterrence is not only non-nuclear but also
non-military—strong, trusting political relationships
between the United States <strong>and</strong> its allies <strong>and</strong> partners
[as well as] enhancing regional security architectures. 21
Strengthened regional security architectures include,
according to the NPR, “effective missile defense,
counter-WMD capabilities, conventional pow-
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