Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

tionship between transparency <strong>and</strong> restraint for the
two acknowledged non-NPT nuclear-armed states.
Because of the difficult strategic situation in which it
finds itself, Pakistan will be tempted to see increased
transparency measures primarily as a means to further
strengthen the deterrent value of its nuclear force.
It might, for example, use a transparency announcement
as an opportunity to overstate both the size of its
arsenal (e.g., through the way it enumerates weapons)
<strong>and</strong> its future plans for increasing it further. If this
were to occur, there would be a danger that mutual
transparency between Pakistan <strong>and</strong> India could fuel
the risk of competitive nuclear buildups.
THE ALLIANCE AND ARMS CONTROL
A process of mutual reductions in U.S. <strong>and</strong> Russian
nuclear arsenals could have a range of effects
on current underst<strong>and</strong>ings of extended deterrence
<strong>and</strong> burden-sharing within <strong>NATO</strong>, with potentially
wider implications for alliance politics. For example,
if the gap between the arsenals of the large <strong>and</strong> small
nuclear-armed states does narrow, then alliances—including
<strong>NATO</strong>—could become a more important element
in shaping the structure of international nuclear
stability. <strong>NATO</strong>, which refers to the strategic forces of
the Alliance as providing the “supreme guarantee” of
the Alliance’s security, already acknowledges that the
nuclear forces of the UK <strong>and</strong> France “contribute to the
overall deterrence <strong>and</strong> security of the Allies.” 6
<strong>NATO</strong> <strong>and</strong> other U.S. alliances have another, probably
more important, effect. The <strong>Nuclear</strong> NPT has
been the central legal pillar in international efforts to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. But it would
not have been possible to persuade key U.S. allies in
471