Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

Strangelovian image for <strong>NATO</strong> in the eyes of peace
<strong>and</strong> antinuclear movements, which the USSR was not
slow to exploit. It also established a political distaste
for TNWs among several European <strong>NATO</strong> publics
which remains today, <strong>and</strong> is increasingly significant
for the weapons’ future.
The Imperative of Forward Defense.
Forward defense seemed the indispensable foundation
for a large, resilient, <strong>and</strong> cohesive Alliance,
given traumatic recent European memories of Nazi
occupation, coupled with the apparently irrevocable
consequences of forced assimilation into the Soviet
bloc. Moreover, Berlin, Germany, a symbolic outpost
of the Cold War, remained indefensible by conventional
means. 10 Maintaining the credibility of such an
inflexible military strategy against larger Soviet <strong>and</strong>
East European (after 1955, Warsaw Pact) forces, made
additional capabilities, such as the nuclear-bolstering
which TNWs would provide, seem absolutely essential.
Korea <strong>and</strong> Rearmament.
The first Soviet nuclear test in 1949, the outbreak of
the Korean War in 1950, <strong>and</strong> a growing perception of
armed Soviet expansionist ambitions created anxieties
which led to the establishment <strong>and</strong> rapid growth of
<strong>NATO</strong>. In February 1952, a <strong>NATO</strong> meeting in Lisbon,
Portugal, set 96 divisions as a force goal. This ambitious
conventional force level subsequently proved
unachievable, due to a combination of cost <strong>and</strong> inefficiency.
11
19