Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

DIFFERING THREAT ASSESSMENTS AND
ALLIANCE COHESION
As observed at the outset of this article, <strong>NATO</strong>
Europe is not a unitary actor but rather a heterogeneous
alliance system whose internal differentiation
<strong>and</strong> complexity have increased since the membership
accession of several former Warsaw Pact countries beginning
in the 1990s. Although the type of post-Cold
War thinking described in the previous section is
widespread in present-day <strong>NATO</strong> Europe, this thinking
is not shared by all members of the Alliance. In addition
to the French nuclear exceptions, a number of
new <strong>NATO</strong> members in CEE perceive security differently
<strong>and</strong> continue to place greater value on the physical
<strong>and</strong> visible presence of U.S. TNWs in Europe. 24
Historical events, both recent <strong>and</strong> distant, help to
explain these countries’ security assessments, which
place a much stronger emphasis on prudent, worstcase-scenario-based
defense planning. These countries’
memories of the dramatic events of the 20th
century are still vivid. The new allies joined <strong>NATO</strong>
because of its collective defense value in avoiding possible
repetition of past events when their very existence
was threatened, first by Nazi Germany <strong>and</strong> later
by the Communist USSR. Even if, after half a century
of peace, Western European members of <strong>NATO</strong> believe
that their security is not threatened, the positions
of CEE members are much more cautious: they do not
feel as secure, <strong>and</strong> they remain concerned about the
threat from Russia.
The new <strong>NATO</strong> members consider U.S.-led <strong>NATO</strong>
to be the ultimate guarantee of their territorial integrity
<strong>and</strong> political independence. Hence, they share a
grave concern about any change that may weaken the
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