Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

Russian Navy would be particularly happy with this
situation—especially in the Northern theater—since
it relies so much on NSNWs as part of its weapons
cache. Moreover, to the extent that the small stockpile
of U.S. NSNWs in Europe keeps the United States
linked to <strong>NATO</strong> <strong>and</strong> therefore ensures a more predictable
<strong>NATO</strong> decision structure <strong>and</strong> U.S. stake in European
affairs, Russia will want to keep its own NSNWs
to ensure a stable “balance” of these weapons <strong>and</strong> to
make the United States aware that any military aggression
against Russia resulting from a <strong>NATO</strong> decision
would produce a Russian strategic strike on U.S.
soil. NSNWs are a kind of “crutch” that the Russians
are leaning on until reforms, somewhere in the future,
can take place. This status quo position, purposely or
not, adds a Cold War veneer to their arguments <strong>and</strong>
rhetoric.
The second position appears more active <strong>and</strong> reformist,
involving the pursuit of arms control talks
while seeking quicker change in the structure of the
Russian armed forces. Like the first view, it desires
an eventual transformation to PGMs in the future,
but is more willing to accede to negotiations both to
buy time for Russian military reform <strong>and</strong> to link a
number of issues to negotiations on the reduction of
NSNWs. In other words, there is a greater potential
in this position for reducing NSNWs in the near to
medium term than in the first. 1 NSNWs become a bargaining
chip, used to exact concessions on issues that
Russia believes the United States ignores in assessing
Russian security concerns. Thus, Russians taking this
stance would like to link discussions about the reduction
of NSNWs to other outst<strong>and</strong>ing issues, such as
the reduction of conventional forces in Europe, particularly
a renegotiation of the Conventional Forces in
111