Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

ous arms control groups argue that this violates Articles
I <strong>and</strong> II of the NPT <strong>and</strong> have applied diplomatic
<strong>and</strong> legal pressure to terminate these agreements. 75
<strong>NATO</strong> remains adamant that nuclear-sharing was legally
“gr<strong>and</strong>fathered” in the drafting of the NPT. Its
position is that control of the nuclear weapons would
not be transferred to the <strong>NATO</strong> NNWS until an actual
conflict occurred, at which point the NPT is no longer
a constraint, <strong>and</strong> that nuclear-sharing is a valuable
barrier to nuclear weapons proliferation in behalf of
which pressures might otherwise build up within the
industrially advanced member states of the Alliance. 76
IV. 1968-1983. TNWS DURING DÉTENTE AND
<strong>NATO</strong>-SOVIET WEAPONS MANEUVERING AS
PRELUDE TO THE SOVIET COLLAPSE
Improving political relations between <strong>NATO</strong> <strong>and</strong>
the Warsaw Pact generally raised European public
skepticism about the strategy of nuclear deterrence,
of which TNWs were the most concrete, local, <strong>and</strong>
targetable symbols. The peace movement, which had
existed since the 1950s, became an increasingly important
factor for <strong>NATO</strong> governments to consider. The
activists developed <strong>and</strong> promulgated a critique claiming
that the superpowers had “overdosed” on deterrence,
which had in turn “poisoned their relationship.
. . . [Yet] they interpreted the tensions <strong>and</strong> crises that
followed as evidence of the need for even more deterrence.
. . . The strategy of deterrence was self-defeating;
it provoked the kind of behaviour it was designed
to prevent.” 77 From this perspective, nuclear-dependent
flexible response was almost as objectionable as
massive retaliation. Another implication of improved
East-West relations for TNWs was the new promise
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