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Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

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y arms c<strong>on</strong>trol <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> n<strong>on</strong>proliferati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> disarmament<br />

initiatives. It will also assess emerging security<br />

challenges (cyber, energy security) as well as the enduring<br />

security challenges of terrorism <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> WMD.<br />

Ultimately, the report will recommend “the right<br />

balance” or “mix” between deterrence, defense, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

missile defense, with the purpose of strengthening the<br />

Alliance posture.<br />

The c<strong>on</strong>sultati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> reflecti<strong>on</strong> phase of the DDPR<br />

was completed in July 2011. Four “scoping papers”<br />

were discussed <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> the North Atlantic Council held<br />

sessi<strong>on</strong>s with experts to discuss the costs <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> benefits<br />

of making changes to either declaratory policy or<br />

force posture. The <str<strong>on</strong>g>NATO</str<strong>on</strong>g> Deputies Committee will<br />

draft the report with the assistance of experts—the<br />

High Level Group or <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nuclear</str<strong>on</strong>g> Planning Group Staff<br />

Group <strong>on</strong> nuclear issues. During the DDPR process, a<br />

number of questi<strong>on</strong>s will need to be addressed. These<br />

include, but are not limited to the following:<br />

• How can <str<strong>on</strong>g>NATO</str<strong>on</strong>g> best dem<strong>on</strong>strate Alliance solidarity<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> maintain a credible Alliance nuclear<br />

posture in its comm<strong>on</strong> commitment to war preventi<strong>on</strong>?<br />

• How can Allies ensure that the nuclear elements<br />

of their deterrence posture remain visible,<br />

credible, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> effective?<br />

• How should the political-military utility of the<br />

nuclear elements of the posture be assessed?<br />

• Does such a requirement necessitate the current<br />

balanced mix of nuclear forces, or could it be<br />

satisfied solely with so-called strategic nuclear<br />

forces provided by the <str<strong>on</strong>g>NATO</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nuclear</str<strong>on</strong>g> Weap<strong>on</strong><br />

States (NWS)?<br />

• Is the stati<strong>on</strong>ing of U.S. nuclear “substrategic”<br />

weap<strong>on</strong>s in Europe still required, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> is the<br />

maintenance of “dual capable aircraft (DCA)”<br />

391

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