Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

national security strategy. Current Western interest in
Russia’s residual arsenal after 2 decades of significant
reductions in that arsenal reflect an increased attention
to such arms in the aftermath of START III, <strong>and</strong> the increased
attention to Global Zero as a long-range objective
of U.S. national policy. They also became part of
a sharpening political debate in the United States over
the success of the reset in U.S.-Russian relations <strong>and</strong>
the assessment of Russia as a challenge to the Euro-
Atlantic community, especially <strong>NATO</strong>. Western policymakers
seem united in the desire to induce Russia
to reduce its tactical nuclear arsenal that faces west.
They might disagree on what concessions the West
might offer to get Russian reductions.
The semi-official Russian position on any arms
control agreement relating to TNWs was stated several
years ago in the context of the increased tensions
associated with the deployment of missile defense
forces in the Czech Republic <strong>and</strong> Pol<strong>and</strong>. In that context,
TNWs were described as Russia’s “trump card.”
Colonel-General Vladimir Verkhovtsev, then Chief of
the 12th Directorate of the Ministry of Defense <strong>and</strong>
charged with the storage of nuclear weapons, stated in
2007 that Russia could begin discussion with the United
States on the reduction of TNWs only under the
condition that two other powers possessing TNWs,
France <strong>and</strong> Great Britain, took part. Verkhovtsev went
on to point out that, in his view, the United States <strong>and</strong>
Russia were in quite different geopolitical situations:
along Russia’s borders, as distinct from the America’s,
“There are other nuclear powers <strong>and</strong> therefore, for
Russia, TNWs are a deterrent factor in case of aggression
against it.” 21
There is, of course, no common agreement about
what TNWs or NSNWs are exactly, except by nega-
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