Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe <strong>and</strong> transform
the classical Article V hard-security mission of
the Alliance into a license for out-of-area interventions
or, worse, transform <strong>NATO</strong> into an organization with
a constant identity crisis. 25
For these CEE countries, tactical nuclear weapons
still possess a residual political-symbolic value to enhance
the credibility of the security guarantees made
by the United States to its allies. 26
For reasons rooted in the different strategic cultures
<strong>and</strong> the disparities in military might between Western
Europe <strong>and</strong> the United States, Central Europeans
believe that their successful defense requires direct
U.S. military involvement. So they tend to associate
any weakening of the transatlantic link with erosion
of their own security. 27
TNWs are considered a test of U.S. commitment to Europe’s
defense <strong>and</strong> of Europe’s interest in keeping the
transatlantic link strong. 28
The issue of TNW forward deployment is entirely
political <strong>and</strong> symbolic for the new <strong>NATO</strong> members in
CEE. At its core, it is a proxy for the lack of confidence
felt by these nations in the future of the U.S. commitment
<strong>and</strong> concern about the diminished solidarity
within the Alliance. 29 In addition to the historical reasons
for the apprehension felt by the new <strong>NATO</strong> members
(highlighted above), their insecurity has grown
in recent years with the dismaying realization that
the reinforcement of conventional forces <strong>and</strong> the upgrade
of infrastructure for their defense, which <strong>NATO</strong>
had promised these countries when they acceded to
<strong>NATO</strong>, would never materialize. The new <strong>NATO</strong> Allies
were also alarmed by the feeble response of the
United States to the invasion of Georgia by Russian
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