Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

few more years, but with the ultimate long-term result
of a slow withering-away of the mission. One analyst
has called this possibility “disarmament by default.” 45
At their meeting in Tallinn, Estonia, in April 2010,
<strong>NATO</strong>’s foreign ministers sought to balance the views
of those nations who sought the removal of the weapons
with those who argued that these weapons were
still relevant to their security <strong>and</strong> to <strong>NATO</strong>’s solidarity.
At the conclusion of the meeting, Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton said that the United States was not
opposed to reductions in the number of U.S. nuclear
weapons in Europe, but that the removal of these
weapons should be linked to a reduction in the number
of Russian NSNWs. The foreign ministers also
agreed that no nuclear weapons would be removed
from Europe unless all 28 member states of <strong>NATO</strong>
agreed. 46
Others have raised the question whether the United
States <strong>and</strong> <strong>NATO</strong> might benefit from the removal
of these weapons from bases in Europe for reasons of
safety <strong>and</strong> security, as well as cost-saving. Some analysts
have suggested that, in response to these concerns,
the United States might consolidate its nuclear
weapons at a smaller number of bases in Europe. According
to another study, officials at U.S. European
Comm<strong>and</strong> have argued that weapons deployed outside
of Europe could be just as credible as deterrents
to attack on <strong>NATO</strong> as forward-deployed weapons
are. 47 In fact, some observers now argue that reducing
or eliminating U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe would
not only address the Air Force’s operational <strong>and</strong> security
costs associated with their deployment, but also
could serve as a signal to Russia of <strong>NATO</strong>’s nonaggressive
intentions. 48
345