Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

lored damage” (zadannyi ushcherb), the 2003 document
for the first time defined “tailored damage” to mean
“damage, subjectively unacceptable to the enemy,
which exceeds the benefits the aggressor expects to
gain as a result of the use of military force.” Tailored
damage is particularly associated with the mission of
de-escalation: a limited response with limited damage
in response to a limited attack would, it was hoped,
de-escalate the crisis.
The 2003 document also provided vital clues to
the role of various elements of the Russian nuclear
forces. The section on the nature of contemporary
wars <strong>and</strong> armed conflicts emphasized, in particular,
that the United States <strong>and</strong> its allies demonstrated the
pattern of using long-range strike weapons, including
airborne delivery systems <strong>and</strong> submarine-launched
cruise missiles (SLCMs), at an early stage of wars in
the 1990s. It also noted that victory was assured by
the ability of the United States <strong>and</strong> <strong>NATO</strong> to achieve
domination at the early stage of conflict. Accordingly,
the new document postulated:
the utmost necessity of having the capability to strike
military assets of the enemy (long-range high-precision
weapons, long-range air forces) outside the immediate
area of conflict. To achieve this, [we] need both our
own long-range high-precision strike capability <strong>and</strong>
other assets that enable [us] to transfer hostilities directly
to enemy territory. 12
By implication, then, the limited nuclear strike had
to be executed at an early stage of the conflict.
These provisions left little role for short-range
nuclear weapons. Exercises held since the adoption of
the 2000 military doctrine simulated limited nuclear
use against airbases <strong>and</strong> aircraft carriers from which
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