Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

turn out to be inconsistent with military requirements.
• States must sustain both unitary sovereign commitments
to territorial defense, <strong>and</strong>, at least for
<strong>NATO</strong> Allies, collective commitments.
• <strong>NATO</strong> members <strong>and</strong> aspirants must be prepared
to field credible forces to meet out-ofarea
contingencies.
3. Reduce costs in an environment of increasing fiscal
austerity.
• Parties are compelled economically to seek <strong>and</strong>
sustain minimum levels of forces to meet legitimate
defense needs.
• Resources will be difficult to find for new or
more robust arms control implementation measures
unless they can demonstrate a compelling
security payoff.
Many readers may be surprised by the absence
from the foregoing list of the following objective: “Establish
a secure <strong>and</strong> stable balance of conventional
armed forces.” This was such a dominant theme of the
original CFE negotiation that it is still heard from time
to time, despite its manifestly Cold War formula for
literally balanced opposing forces. But with the notion
of such a “balance” amounting to a mathematical
equation with no feasible contemporary solution, it
seems clear that future successes in conventional arms
control efforts will depend heavily on a final passage
from the scene of the mindset behind this term.
KEY ISSUES
How might the three broad objectives inform discussion
of the disposition of non-strategic nuclear
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