Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

allistic missile defense (BMD), <strong>and</strong> to the U.S. superiority
in non-nuclear precision-guided weapons. 5
As for ballistic missile defense (BMD), it has already
caused <strong>and</strong> continues to cause a great deal of
suspicion <strong>and</strong> irritation for Russia. In the middle of
the last decade, when the first notion about U.S. plans
to deploy BMD sites close to Russian borders in the
Czech Republic, Pol<strong>and</strong>, Romania, <strong>and</strong> Turkey was
made public, Russia responded by threatening to deploy
additional numbers of tactical missiles capable
of delivering TNWs near the Russian-Polish border
in Kaliningrad Oblast. Owing to this <strong>NATO</strong> anti-missile
defense plan, which did not presuppose Russian
participation, Russian strategic planning was inevitably
impacted, with Russians immediately suspecting
a major anti-Russian trend in <strong>NATO</strong> policy. Such
thinking remains dominant today, <strong>and</strong> it is naturally
present in the discussion over the possibility of U.S.-
Russian TNW negotiations:
Washington could have cancelled its plans to deploy
national BMD systems in Eastern <strong>and</strong> Southern Europe,
which would have unavoidably undermined the
Russian potential for nuclear deterrence. . . . Even in
the case of a minimal preservation in the numbers of
U.S. SNW [strategic nuclear weapons] <strong>and</strong> TNW, even
the possibility of their application by Washington on
its own will, during a first strike under the cover of the
“anti-missile shield,” negatively influence the national
security of Russia. 6
Comments on the issue of BMD at the moment are
probably more emotion-laden than other subjects in
the context of nuclear arms. Russians tend to see in
the relevant U.S. <strong>and</strong> <strong>NATO</strong> plans numerous negative
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