Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

ployed tactical nuclear weapons in particular offered
U.S. forces the option of at least putatively selective
<strong>and</strong> restrained employment of nuclear weapons in a
limited conflict. While U.S. planners struggled in Asia
as much as they did in Europe to develop plausible
<strong>and</strong> sensible limited-strike options, the ability to use
nuclear weapons in a relatively tailored <strong>and</strong> militarily
effective fashion was seen to add to deterrence
because such strikes were viewed as more plausible
since they were at least notionally more proportional
to the stakes <strong>and</strong> intensity of a limited conflict. 21
Even as their military role declined, however, U.S.
nuclear weapons grew in importance as methods for
assuring allies. This role became increasingly salient in
the 1970s as Washington grew more concerned about
the problems posed by the proliferation of nuclear
weapons even as South Korea <strong>and</strong> Taiwan, motivated
by Washington’s insistence that allies shoulder more
of their defense, explored acquiring nuclear weapons
capabilities of their own. 22 Forward-deployed forces,
including nuclear weapons, were seen to help allay
allied concerns about ab<strong>and</strong>onment that could drive
them to acquire nuclear weapons of their own.
The collapse of the Soviet Union dramatically accelerated
the U.S. military’s shift away from reliance
on nuclear weapons. Already diminished in their salience
by the growth of Soviet nuclear forces <strong>and</strong> the
strengthening of U.S. conventional forces, U.S. nuclear
weapons were essentially marginalized in U.S.
planning for strictly military purposes by the collapse
of the only nation that had threatened U.S. pretensions
to global military preeminence. In response to
these developments, the George H. W. Bush administration
sharply cut the arsenal <strong>and</strong> curtailed the
modernization of U.S. nuclear forces, eliminating all
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