Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

ously create a public <strong>and</strong>, above all, nuclear symbol
that the Kremlin could use with Western European
people against their governments.” 111 German political
resistance was also predictably adamant, <strong>and</strong> the
modernization never occurred.
Negotiations in Vienna, Austria, began to move
toward signing of the CFE Treaty, aimed at introducing
transparency <strong>and</strong> confidence-building measures,
<strong>and</strong> eliminating many of the most threatening offensive
combat assets. The CFE (signed in November
1990) greatly reduced future dangers of surprise conventional
attack. In the summer of 1990, the political
necessities of securing German reunification involved
promises to Mikhail Gorbachev to conduct a comprehensive
strategy review, <strong>and</strong> as the <strong>NATO</strong> summit approached,
a package of measures which would signal
reduced nuclear reliance within the Alliance (while
still resisting No First Use), <strong>and</strong> also signal a general
move away from early nuclear use. <strong>NATO</strong> nuclear
weapons would “truly become weapons of last resort.”
This wording was initially challenged by French
President Francois Mitterr<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher, but, after intense debate at
the <strong>NATO</strong> heads of government meeting in London
on July 5, 1990, the wording was preserved. U.S. proposals
to eliminate all nuclear artillery shells from
Europe were accepted, <strong>and</strong> it was agreed that there
would be reviews to consider new strategic principles
replacing forward defense <strong>and</strong> flexible response. The
London Communiqué, according to Michael Wheeler,
represented the end of Cold War nuclear strategy. 112
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