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Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

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levels of enthusiasm, most European countries are<br />

genuinely committed to nuclear abolishment, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> it<br />

can be cogently argued that the current debate about<br />

TNWs would not have emerged without the global visi<strong>on</strong><br />

for “a world free of nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s” endorsed<br />

by U.S. President Barack Obama. 15<br />

With the main excepti<strong>on</strong> of France, which c<strong>on</strong>tinues<br />

to attribute great value to its nuclear arsenal <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

remains explicitly against any change in the Alliance’s<br />

nuclear posture, 16 in most of Europe, nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s<br />

have not <strong>on</strong>ly been drastically devalued as effective<br />

military instruments but have also lost their attractiveness<br />

as symbols of power, status, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> prestige. With<br />

the end of the Cold War, a process of delegitimizati<strong>on</strong> of<br />

nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s began. The utility of these weap<strong>on</strong>s<br />

was gradually devalued <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> disparaged, thereby reducing<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> eventually annulling any positive evaluati<strong>on</strong><br />

of their efficacy, legitimacy, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> authority. 17 Even<br />

am<strong>on</strong>g the more c<strong>on</strong>servative, status-quo-pr<strong>on</strong>e countries<br />

of CEE, support for U.S. nuclear forward deployment<br />

is not ideological <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> absolute; rather, it is qualified,<br />

pragmatic, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> negotiable, as will be discussed in<br />

the next secti<strong>on</strong>.<br />

Within this general c<strong>on</strong>text, in many <str<strong>on</strong>g>NATO</str<strong>on</strong>g> European<br />

nati<strong>on</strong>s, tactical weap<strong>on</strong>s are increasingly regarded<br />

as weap<strong>on</strong>s of little or no intrinsic value per se<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> as negative symbols that weaken the credibility<br />

of Western countries’ commitment to the n<strong>on</strong>proliferati<strong>on</strong><br />

objectives of Articles I <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> II of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nuclear</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

N<strong>on</strong>-Proliferati<strong>on</strong> Treaty (NPT) <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> the disarmament<br />

objective of Article VI. 18 The forward deployment of<br />

U.S. nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> the territories of countries<br />

that are signatories of the NPT as n<strong>on</strong>-nuclear-weap<strong>on</strong><br />

states raises issues of compatibility with the spirit<br />

(if not the letter) of the Treaty. 19 This is more than a<br />

284

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