Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

to anticipate a huge immediate nuclear counterforce
duel, in which nuclear assets <strong>and</strong> comm<strong>and</strong> systems
throughout Europe would be targeted by conventional
air attack <strong>and</strong> TNWs. The huge number of nuclear
assets, <strong>and</strong> the unthinkable scale of the consequent
destruction if they were ever used, became in itself a
source of reassurance. TNWs were also an emblem of
U.S. commitment:
The stockpile size for l<strong>and</strong>-based weapons was pegged
at “around 7,000 warheads” by McNamara in 1966
<strong>and</strong> “was maintained within the 7,000 to 8,000 range
by policies of retirement <strong>and</strong> progressive replacement
during most of the 1970s” since the stockpile level itself
became a political symbol of American coupling
<strong>and</strong> the political sign of multilateral participation in
nuclear use planning <strong>and</strong> decision-making, the most
important of Alliance functions.…Regardless of
<strong>NATO</strong>’s military requirements, the nuclear weapons
stockpile could not be reduced without appearing to
diminish political commitment to the Alliance. 83
Development of a Shared <strong>NATO</strong> <strong>Nuclear</strong> Culture.
The NPG with its subordinate committee, the High
Level Group (HLG), became an instrument which the
United States used to persuade Europeans of the imperatives
of nuclear strategy <strong>and</strong> which Europeans
used to persuade the Americans to give them more
information regarding the deployment <strong>and</strong> contemplated
use of these weapons on their own territory.
<strong>NATO</strong>’s notorious security leakiness made American
caution underst<strong>and</strong>able, but it had originally applied
even to bilateral contacts at the highest level. When
de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, the French
President asked the SACEUR whether U.S. forces in
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