Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

exercises near each other’s territory, <strong>and</strong> increase mutual
transparency at military bases near the <strong>NATO</strong>/
Russia frontier.
Whether or not specific confidence-building measures—nuclear
or conventional—are undertaken, it
seems certain that the U.S. conventional troop presence
in Europe will be reduced in coming years as a
result of the combined effect of budget cuts <strong>and</strong> the
relative priority being given to preserving U.S. conventional
capabilities in the Asia Pacific. Similar factors
could also lead to further reductions in Russia’s
Europe-based forces, as it seeks to maintain adequate
capabilities against potential threats to its south <strong>and</strong>
east. <strong>NATO</strong>’s European member states are also planning
to reduce their conventional forces, whether or
not there is any agreement with Russia to do so. In
the absence of a new conventional forces agreement,
American <strong>and</strong> Russian withdrawal from Europe could
still be reversed over a period of months in the event
of a new <strong>and</strong> protracted European security crisis. But
the very fact that neither country feels that Europe is
a priority for its conventional forces suggests that neither
believes that such a crisis is likely. This broader
context—mutual, but uncoordinated, reductions in
conventional forces—may make it easier to achieve
parallel progress in nuclear arms.
NUMBERS AND VISIBILITY
As in the case of conventional forces, therefore,
reciprocal reductions in Europe-based nuclear forces
may not take the form of a single all-encompassing
process. They could, instead, involve some combination
of gradual reductions <strong>and</strong> increased transparency.
While both have an important role to play, however, it
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