Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

through widespread protests, openly supported by the
Soviet government <strong>and</strong> cl<strong>and</strong>estinely backed by KGB
“active measures,” such as the tacit financing of peace
movements <strong>and</strong> the provision of disinformation to
the Western news media. President Carter capitulated
to multiple pressures <strong>and</strong> delayed the ERW program
indefinitely, though secretly ordering production of
components that could be assembled in 48 hours <strong>and</strong>
airlifted to Europe. 96 The conclusion drawn from this
affair by one scholar was that determined leadership
within <strong>NATO</strong> (usually the United States) is indispensable
for making such decisions since the “modernization
of nuclear weapons in Europe cannot be managed
by a pluralist approach to decision making.” 97
TNWs <strong>and</strong> the Euromissile Crisis, 1977-1987. The
ERW debacle raised still further the political costs of
any <strong>NATO</strong> nuclear modernization. The Intermediate
<strong>Nuclear</strong> Forces (INF) crisis is a separate <strong>and</strong> complex
subject, but had important interactions with TNWs.
The anxieties over the multiple independently targetable
reentry vehicled (MIRV) Soviet SS-20s, capable
of striking anywhere in Europe from within the Soviet
Union, were very much connected with the risk that
the immediate escalatory response option represented
by SS-20s would negate <strong>NATO</strong> use of TNWs, then still
its main deterrent capability against a Warsaw Pact attack.
This prospect would create not only a military
weakness but resultant possibilities of intimidation
during periods of tension short of war. The crisis that
followed focused all of <strong>NATO</strong>’s political attention as
the Soviets continued to deploy SS-20s while <strong>NATO</strong>
committed itself to a dual-track decision to deploy
new, intermediate-range systems while attempting
to negotiate reductions with Moscow, despite intense
political opposition.
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