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18. Helmut Schmidt, Richard von Weizsäcker, Egon Bahr <strong>and</strong> Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Toward a <strong>Nuclear</strong>-Free World: A German View,” Original Version published on January 9, 2009 in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, available from www. nytimes.com/2009/01/09/opinion/09iht-edschmidt.1.19226604. html?pagewanted=all. 19. See Götz Neuneck, “Is a World without <strong>Nuclear</strong> <strong>Weapons</strong> Attainable? Comparative Perspectives on Goals <strong>and</strong> Prospects,” in Catherine M. Kelleher <strong>and</strong> Judith Reppy, eds., Getting to Zero— The Path to <strong>Nuclear</strong> Disarmament, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011, pp. 43-66. 20. See Tom Sauer <strong>and</strong> Bob van der Zwaan, “U.S. <strong>Tactical</strong> <strong>Nuclear</strong> <strong>Weapons</strong> in Europe after <strong>NATO</strong>´s Lisbon Summit: Why Their Withdrawal is Desirable <strong>and</strong> Feasible,” Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, May 2011; Johan Bergenäs, Miles A. Pomper, William Potter, <strong>and</strong> Nikolai Sokov, “Reducing <strong>and</strong> Regulating <strong>Tactical</strong> (Non-Strategic) <strong>Nuclear</strong> <strong>Weapons</strong> in Europe: Moving Forward?” Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute of International Studies, The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, April 2010. 21. The Coalition Agreement between the CDU, CSU, <strong>and</strong> FDP, “Growth, Education, Unity”, Berlin, Germany, October 26, 2009, p. 170, available from www.cdu.de/doc/<strong>pdf</strong>c/091215-koalitionsvertrag-2009-2013-englisch.<strong>pdf</strong>. 22. Speech by Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle at the 46th Munich Security Conference, February 6, 2010. 23. Willy Claes, Jean-Luc Dehaene, Louis Michel, <strong>and</strong> Guy Verhofstadt, “Het is Nu of Nooit,” De St<strong>and</strong>aard, February 19, 2010. An unofficial Translation is available from www.pugwash. org/reports/nw/nuclear-weapons-free-statements/NWFW_statements_ Belgium.htm. 24. Sauer <strong>and</strong> van der Zwaan, p. 13. 25. See Paul Zajac, “<strong>NATO</strong>’s Defense <strong>and</strong> Deterrence Posture Review: A French Perspective on <strong>Nuclear</strong> Issues,” <strong>Nuclear</strong> Policy 277
Paper, No. 7, Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, British American Security Information Council, Institute for Peace Research <strong>and</strong> Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), 2011. 26. Jacek Durkalec, Reductions of <strong>Tactical</strong> <strong>Nuclear</strong> <strong>Weapons</strong> in Europe: Unbinding the Gordian Knot, Warsaw, Pol<strong>and</strong>: The Polish Institute of International Affairs, Strategic File #16, May 2011. 27. Carl Bildt <strong>and</strong> Radek Sikorski, “Next the <strong>Tactical</strong> Nukes,” The New York Times, February 2010. 28. Mustafa Kibaroglu, Turkey, <strong>NATO</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Nuclear</strong> Sharing: Prospects after <strong>NATO</strong>’s Lisbon Summit, Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, British American Security Information Council, Institute for Peace Research <strong>and</strong> Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), May 2011. 29. Oliver Meier, “<strong>NATO</strong> Revises <strong>Nuclear</strong> Policy,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 40, No. 10, 2010, pp. 28ff. 30. Oliver Meier, ”<strong>NATO</strong> Sets Up Arms Control Committee,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 41 No. 3, 2011, pp. 32ff. 31. See Michael Brzoska, Anne Finger, Oliver Meier, Götz Neuneck, <strong>and</strong> Wolfgang Zellner, Prospects for Arms Control in Europe, Berlin, Germany: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, November 2011. 32. See Wolfgang Zellner, Hans-Joachim Schmidt, <strong>and</strong> Götz Neuneck, eds., Die Zukunft konventioneller Rüstungskontrolle in Europa (The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe), Baden- Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2009. 33. See Ivanka Barzashka, Timur Kadyshev, Götz Neuneck, <strong>and</strong> Ivan Oelrich, “How to Avoid a New Arms Race,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 25, 2011. 278
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Visit our website for other free pu
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***** Comments pertaining to this r
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6. Aspects of the Current Russian P
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21. Arms Control after START ......
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this incredible amount of destructi
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hundreds of U.S. weapons (a
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TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND <stron
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Security was an additional problem.
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embraced lessons learned from the 1
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I learned here of some of the deep
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CHAPTER 1 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT Ri
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as just another kind of military op
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it, the Allies were unlikely to agr
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• Assets for future arms control
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ments are dissimilar. Whereas Europ
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CHAPTER 2 TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
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ombs in Europe as strategic weapons
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experiences of war, in a less moral
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Strangelovian image for NAT
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II. 1953-1963. U.S. STRATEGIC SUPER
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• For what political purposes mig
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widely heralded move to flexible re
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clear sentiment for the Alliance <s
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Nevertheless, Germany underst<stron
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first in order to break up his forc
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saw Pact lines to interdict strateg
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The Democratic People’s Republic
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given release authority by the Sovi
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III. 1963-1967. EMERGING DOUBTS CON
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esponse: without it, the Allies wer
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ous arms control groups argue that
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Why Did NATO Keep
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France were equipped with nuclear w
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slowly changing deterrence ethos wa
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through widespread protests, openly
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although it decided that the remain
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e concealed by the regular annual <
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However, concerned by the post-Viet
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ously create a public and</
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ers have repeatedly reemphasized th
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judged to generate (but which may n
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5. “The position we have reached
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24. Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructe
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49. Catherine McArdle Kelleher, “
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76. Joseph F. Pilat and</st
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100. Corroborated by Catherine Kell
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CHAPTER 3 U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLI
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the North Atlantic Treaty Organizat
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delivery exercised a dominant influ
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conventional strength. 14 In the Pa
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the capability to employ such weapo
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ground-launched short-range nuclear
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curity policy in Asia, and<
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lies. 31 At the strategic a
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mediate postwar period. Washington
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ons throughout the Cold War <strong
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These shifts are the products both
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power and the prol
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7. Robert S. Norris et al., “Wher
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frey A. Larsen and
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near Central Europe and</st
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47. Available from armedservices.ho
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CHAPTER 4 RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES ON T
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Russian Navy would be particularly
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ers to produce income from Russian
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3. These are the results of polls o
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TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE FE
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Russia’s anticipated spending of
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arms race was on, and</stro
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heads; and improve
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national security strategy. Current
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On April 23, 1999, Viktor Nikolaevi
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First of all, the word “obligatio
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By 2004, a young scholar, Aleksei F
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time, it seems to believe that, in
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ence as the chief factor that limit
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their modernization as a response.
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in areas affecting Russian national
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armed struggle at sea for the perio
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centric warfare. Citing both Chines
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tation to maintain security <strong
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PROSPECTS FOR A U.S.-RUSSIAN TREATY
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uild a missile defense system in so
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10. “Ktokhitree: Mir vstupil v er
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36. Sergei Karaganov “Global Zero
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CHAPTER 6 ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT RU
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NATO countries. Du
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allistic missile defense (BMD), <st
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Meanwhile, the factor of China (wit
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Today, in fact, only the nuclear um
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By the same logic, preventing a pot
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diminishes still further Russian in
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1989 —April 12 SHORT-RANGE NUCLEA
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where Russian interest is higher th
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6. Kozin, “Five obstacles.” 7.
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CHAPTER 7 INFLUENCES ON RUSSIAN POL
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general and its ow
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are show of unanimity from nearly a
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ally; it is just that others are ac
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to direct Russian toward multilater
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armor, like T-62 tanks and<
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Reducing Non-Strategic Nucl
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The Russian inventory has been redu
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Under present conditions, the range
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Ws should be multilateral, with the
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continue the practice of conducting
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the General Staff Nikolai Makarov o
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CHAPTER 8 RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES ON N
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Yet these concerns are most likely
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Bush and Mikhail G
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anyone’s guess. As mentioned abov
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STRATEGY Russian NSNWs attracted in
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lored damage” (zadannyi ushcherb)
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intrigue pertaining to nuclear weap
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eaching political, military, <stron
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Inertia. The longer this position i
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In a similar vein, the Foreign Mini
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THE RUSSIAN NSNW POSITION: LIMITS A
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tated to what it calls an “integr
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8 1. “Zayavlen
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13. The 12th Main Department of the
Page 248: PART III EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 227
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that these weapons still have a rol
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with nuclear weapons, and</
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homeland. The trad
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However, if the United States were
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(estimated, to be 150-200) of U.S.
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er-projection capabilities, <strong
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ventional weapons. Unlike the perce
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any U.S. NSNWs deployed or stored i
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ganizational changes in recent year
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It is unrealistic to believe, as so
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Prague agenda with its goal of glob
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has a different set of critical qua
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 15 1. Assistant
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15. Ibid., p. xii. 16. Ibid. 17. Ib
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Hans M. Kristensen, “Nucl
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52. See Jeffrey A. Larsen a
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Hence, whatever course the Allies s
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self from the conflict. Of course,
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arguments by and l
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cal to the later stages of this cam
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The fundamentals of Smart Defense a
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deterrence and def
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 16 1. These are
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CHAPTER 17 ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
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Two of the greatest enduring threat
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a monkey to an altitude of 120 km (
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including a “dual capable” (nuc
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By the end of the Cold War, in 1991
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U.S. Focus and Int
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eset by conflict, deterrence seeks
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Command in 2010. H
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y arms control and
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into account the disparity between
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Furthermore, the United States <str
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table price human beings must pay t
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16. See www.tradereform.org/wp-cont
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PART V ARMS CONTROL AS AN OPTION 40
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ise as a vehicle for regulating <st
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arms control to address the perceiv
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posite discussion within the contex
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CHAPTER 19 ARMS CONTROL OPTIONS FOR
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U.S. AND RUSSIAN NON-STRATEGIC NUCL
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into the discussion is that it woul
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get missiles on NATO</stron
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ficials have announced a major 10-y
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the INF Treaty banned all INF missi
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Others have also suggested that tra
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ample of the latter, in 1991 Presid
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certain percentage, say 50 percent.
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heads. Nondeployed strategic warhea
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ily in Washington’s judgment, <st
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publican president is less clear at
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10. “Strategic Concept for the De
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CHAPTER 20 TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
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Most of the attempted adaptation <s
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ight metric (and t
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weapons (NSNWs)? A look at the key
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other, has ever gained serious cons
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who occasionally address other thea
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most of the other parties. Russia
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security concerns and</stro
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objectives and out
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CHAPTER 21 ARMS CONTROL AFTER START
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withdrawal as part of a wider disen
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ience with the Anti-Ballistic Missi
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strengthening of first-strike stabi
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ons away from the territory of <str
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is the relationship between them th
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would have added credibility were i
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still making a substantial contribu
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tionship between transparency <stro
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NATO WILL SURVIVE
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As in the past, the most likely cau
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summit on the effective control of
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deployed to Europe to approximately
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NATO policymakers.
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One of the alliances, the Warsaw Pa
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Hungary, and Slova
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statement at the conclusion of the
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anti-ballistic missiles on Polish t
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Following the meeting of OSCE forei
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inform Russia of any significant ch
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are difficult to correlate complete
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West. President Obama noted such a
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ing agreements. It must also combin
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19. Ibid. 20. Lachowski, p. 5. 21.
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PART VI CONCLUSION 505
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that means. Today, this seems to be
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more prosaic level, the presence of
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fence and Foreign
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JEFFREY A. LARSEN is a Senior Scien
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GUY B. ROBERTS was until recently <
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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE Major General
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