Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

dard American strategy—inflicting severe casualties,
even near defeat, on the enemy during the opening
stage of any military campaign using precision-guided
weapons launched from long distances. It was also
noted that Russian “de-escalation” strategy foresees
limited use of nuclear weapons against bases, aircraft
carriers, <strong>and</strong> comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control centers involved
in such a campaign.
Seen from that perspective, the unfavorable balance
of traditional conventional forces in Europe,
which are subject to the CFE Treaty (as well as to the
Adapted CFE) are not much of a concern for Moscow.
They expect that an attack, if it took place, would not
involve these forces. Hence, one could, under the right
set of circumstances, easily drop CFE issues from the
package advocated by Moscow. Missile defense could
also be discussed separately, in the context of the strategic
balance.
Tackling NSNWs <strong>and</strong> long-range strike assets
within the same agreement would be highly uncomfortable
<strong>and</strong> unconventional. Yet, if we cannot agree
on the complete withdrawal of U.S. TNWs from
Europe, this approach is something to think about.
Ukrainian researcher Polina Sinovets proposed in a
recent paper that a ratio of one NSNW per an agreed
number of conventional strike assets could be established
to achieve at least some reduction of Russian
NSNWs <strong>and</strong> a set of transparency measures covering
both classes of assets in Europe. 21 This would not be
an easy package to negotiate, but at least it would attempt
to meet Russian concerns. At the moment, unfortunately,
the U.S./<strong>NATO</strong> position certainly does
not force Moscow to negotiate, nor even tempt it to
do so.
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