Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

General Political Guidelines (GPGs), which stated that
initial use of nuclear weapons would occur mainly on
the territory of the aggressor, viz., the Soviet Union.
The principal purpose would be to signal <strong>NATO</strong> resolve
to escalate to the strategic level if necessary. The
GPGs shifted the weight of targeting options from the
battlefield itself toward deep strikes on Warsaw Pact
territory, thus ab<strong>and</strong>oning any notion of demonstrative
use as mentioned in the PPGs. It was now accepted
that the initial signal had to be militarily effective.
But the <strong>NATO</strong> allies did not resolve the difference between
the persistent U.S. preference for battlefield use
of TNWs to achieve well-defined military objectives
while limiting escalation, on one h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the West
German insistence on deep strikes precisely to emphasize
the risks of escalation. The GPGs were described
as shifting further towards signaling <strong>and</strong> away from
warfighting, but they covered every contingency <strong>and</strong>
ruled out none. 106 However, within a very few years
these disputes over the development of flexible response
would be obsolete.
TNWs in Korea. On the Korean Peninsula, the
worldwide reduction of U.S. nuclear weapons was
especially complicated. The serious direct threat from
reckless DPRK aggression, as well as China’s military
buildup, promoted interest on the part of U.S. allies
in achieving their own independent nuclear weapons
capability, which Washington opposed.
TNWs could be used as a signal <strong>and</strong> a reminder of
deterrent realities. In 1975, when DPRK leader Kim Il
Sung appeared to be emboldened by the U.S. weakness
apparently demonstrated by the fall of Saigon,
U.S. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger decided that
“we had to stop him in his tracks. I broke a long-established
practice <strong>and</strong> declared we had nuclear weapons
in South Korea <strong>and</strong> would use them if necessary.” 107
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