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Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

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uild a missile defense system in southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern<br />

Europe <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> maintaining its TNWs in Europe, make<br />

successful negotiati<strong>on</strong>s unlikely.<br />

The difficulties associated with negotiating these<br />

issues foreshadowed the crisis of November 2011. Negotiati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

<strong>on</strong> TNWs will have to wait for the current<br />

crisis of U.S.-Russian relati<strong>on</strong>s to pass, which means<br />

sometime after the 2012 presidential electi<strong>on</strong>s in Russia<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> the United States. A successful approach will<br />

have to take into account the complexity of the political-military<br />

challenges, dangers, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> threats as Russia’s<br />

government sees them in Eurasia. That may create<br />

too complex a geopolitical forum for the c<strong>on</strong>duct of<br />

actual negotiati<strong>on</strong>s because Russia will not join them if<br />

it sees them seeking to put Russia in a positi<strong>on</strong> where<br />

it will have to choose between the Euro-Atlantic world<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> that of a Far East dominated by China. By every<br />

means possible, Russia will seek to avoid the dilemma<br />

of choice here. As l<strong>on</strong>g as Russia’s government c<strong>on</strong>siders<br />

its own c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al forces insufficient <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g>/or<br />

ineffective in the defense of Russia’s periphery, TNWs<br />

will remain the means of choice to de-escalate such<br />

c<strong>on</strong>flicts. It is, of course, not altogether clear here that<br />

the Russian Wol<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> can avoid being drawn into an<br />

exp<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g>ing c<strong>on</strong>flict because of the acti<strong>on</strong>s of his “little<br />

dem<strong>on</strong>s.”<br />

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5<br />

1. This chapter is a c<strong>on</strong>tinuati<strong>on</strong> of work by this author which<br />

began a decade ago after Zapad-99 <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> has c<strong>on</strong>tinued with greater<br />

intensity over the last 2 years. The chapter draws up<strong>on</strong> that body<br />

of work <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> extends the analysis. The relevant works include:<br />

“Asian Drivers of Russia’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nuclear</str<strong>on</strong>g> Force Posture,” N<strong>on</strong>proliferati<strong>on</strong><br />

Policy Educati<strong>on</strong> Center, August 2010; “Russia’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nuclear</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

Posture <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Threat That Dare not Speak Its Name,” Stephen<br />

149

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