Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

<strong>and</strong> militarily weak Baltic states feel vulnerable <strong>and</strong> fear ab<strong>and</strong>onment
(<strong>and</strong> therefore are very much pro-status quo), Pol<strong>and</strong> seems
more self-confident as a medium-sized European power <strong>and</strong> is
more prepared to discuss the issue <strong>and</strong> conditions of withdrawal,
especially as a bargaining chip to encourage Russia to reduce its
nuclear weaponry based near Central Europe.
25. Lukasz Kulesa, “Polish <strong>and</strong> Central European Priorities
for <strong>NATO</strong>’s Future <strong>Nuclear</strong> Policy,” in Ingram <strong>and</strong> Meier, p. 16.
26. Similar dynamics were at work among the “old” <strong>NATO</strong>
members at the height of the Cold War, when, in the words of
historian Michael Howard:
The American military presence was wanted in Western
Europe, not just in the negative role of a deterrent to Soviet
aggression, but in the positive role of a reassurance to the
West Europeans; the kind of reassurance a child needs from
its parents or an invalid from his doctors against dangers
which, however remote, cannot be entirely discounted.
See Michael Howard, “Reassurance <strong>and</strong> deterrence: Western defense
in the 1980s,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 2, 1982-83, p. 309.
If Charles de Gaulle was uncertain about American willingness to
sacrifice Washington or New York to save Paris, today there are
even more reasons to wonder whether the nuclearization of an
American city is an acceptable consequence of defending Vilnius
or Tallinn.
27. Tomas Valasek, “Central Europe <strong>and</strong> <strong>NATO</strong>’s <strong>Nuclear</strong>
Deterrent,” in Malcolm Chalmers <strong>and</strong> Andrew Somerville, eds.,
If the Bombs Go: European Perspectives on <strong>NATO</strong>’s <strong>Nuclear</strong> Debate,
Westminster, UK: RUSI, Whitehall Report, Vol. 1, 2011, p. 21.
28. Ibid.
29. As previously seen, similar dynamics are at work in the
case of Turkey.
30. At the same time, the new <strong>NATO</strong> members believe strongly
that TNWs should not be further reduced or withdrawn unilaterally,
<strong>and</strong> they see the need to engage the Russians to reciprocate
with their much larger tactical arsenal.
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