Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

It is unrealistic to believe, as some analysts <strong>and</strong>
certain <strong>NATO</strong> allies argue, that in the near-term missile
defenses could supplant the function performed
by U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, either in terms
of providing deterrence or in serving as a military or
political substitute for the existing Alliance nuclearsharing
function. Missile defenses would be inadequate
substitutes until the arrival of a technology <strong>and</strong>
weapons regime in which the defense is superior to
the offense. The transition to such a defense-dominant
world, one in which, as President Ronald Reagan envisioned,
nuclear weapons had become “impotent
<strong>and</strong> obsolete,” does not appear to be likely anytime
soon, despite President Obama’s call for a nuclear-free
world. 49
The <strong>NATO</strong> Alliance has several big questions that
it needs to address during its ongoing Deterrence <strong>and</strong>
Defense Posture Review (DDPR). These also have political
implications for the United States <strong>and</strong> its force
structure decisions. For example, does the Alliance
believe that it still needs nuclear weapons stationed
in Europe to survive as an alliance? How low can the
number of U.S. forward-deployed weapons go <strong>and</strong>
still provide assurance to the allies? Will the Alliance
actually make a strategic decision regarding its nuclear
future, or will it allow the capabilities to atrophy
by default? And if the Alliance makes the decision to
retain this mission, is there any structure as good for
nuclear-sharing as the current DCA construct?
AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS
The United States has a number of national interests
that may require the use, or threatened use, of
nuclear weapons. First is homel<strong>and</strong> defense. The U.S.
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