Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

In a similar vein, the Foreign Ministry, another
important player in the arms control “game,” is also
reluctant to push for a change of the Russian position:
it has many other more pressing items on its agenda,
<strong>and</strong> apparently seeks to exploit NSNWs as a lever to
achieve diplomatic goals. In other words, the present
lineup of interest groups within the Russian government
strongly favors the continuation of the current
position. It can be changed only in response to a strong
push from above, from the political leadership. The
alternative is some sort of package deal that includes
major western concessions. Over the years, however,
the “asking price” has become so high that <strong>NATO</strong>
concessions on the scale needed to win the national
majority to the side of NSNW reduction, or even serious
transparency, appear unlikely.
ARMS CONTROL CHALLENGES
Russian ambivalence with regard to NSNWs might
also reflect the challenges of crafting a verifiable treaty.
The traditional approach, according to which nuclear
weapons are accounted for <strong>and</strong> neutralized through
verifiable reduction of nuclear-capable delivery vehicles,
is inapplicable to TNWs. New accounting rules
<strong>and</strong> verification procedures need to be designed for
these weapons. This endeavor, in turn, involves much
more intrusive verification at military bases <strong>and</strong>, for
the first time, at one of the most sensitive categories
of nuclear-related facilities—storage sites for nuclear
weapons. While such procedures are not, in principle,
unthinkable, it would require a huge investment of
political resources to overcome entrenched resistance
<strong>and</strong> political opposition.
217