Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

continue the practice of conducting recovery exercises
in which Russia <strong>and</strong> U.S./<strong>NATO</strong> forces work together
to recover stolen nuclear weapons or fissile material.
No Increase Commitment. As a minimal step,
Russia <strong>and</strong> the United States might consider announcing
that each will not increase the number of its nonstrategic
nuclear warheads.
<strong>NATO</strong>’s Strategic Concept pledged to seek the relocation
of Russian nuclear weapons away from <strong>NATO</strong>
territory. Such a move on the part of Russia is not
practical, however, since it would be too costly <strong>and</strong>
could reduce the operational capabilities of the Russian
armed forces, especially of the Russian Northern
Fleet. But the previously listed CBMs on NSNWs
could by themselves build trust <strong>and</strong> momentum for
broader progress on a much wider range of political
<strong>and</strong> security issues.
There is one sensitive issue that must be resolved
if U.S.-Russian agreement on CBMs regarding TNWs
is to be reached. Transparency on this issue is very important
to some European states. In all the informal
discussions concerning the question of transparency
of NSNWs, it is presupposed that the United States is
going to share information on Russian TNWs with its
<strong>NATO</strong> allies. But such an approach is contrary to the
Russian official position based on reciprocity. Thus, as
with possible limitations <strong>and</strong> reductions of NSNWs,
with regard to CBMs, Russia will definitely insist on
French <strong>and</strong> UK involvement in the process or even
discussion of <strong>NATO</strong>’s nuclear potential as a whole.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7
1. Thomas Friedman, The Lexus <strong>and</strong> the Olive Tree, New York:
Ferrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999, p. 8.
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