Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared on the subject
of NSNWs that negotiations cannot be held on
just one element of the strategic balance because that
balance includes many other elements, such as conventional
strategic weapons, space-based weapons,
missile defense, <strong>and</strong> imbalance in conventional forces
(in that order). 20 The piling up of additional conditions
reflected perhaps the perceived Russian fear of stronger
U.S. pressure on Moscow with regard to NSNW
negotiations <strong>and</strong> of the possibility that the Obama
administration might actually offer a complete withdrawal
of U.S. TNWs from Europe as part of a proposed
package (there was widespread belief in 2009
that withdrawal was on the agenda of the new White
House team).
Complete withdrawal of U.S. TNWs from Europe
remains perhaps the only option to force Russia to start
discussion of NSNWs: Russia has promised to do so
<strong>and</strong>, whether it wants to or not, it will not have much
choice. This option appears closed for the moment,
however, since <strong>NATO</strong> is unlikely to ab<strong>and</strong>on the Lisbon
consensus in the near future. Paradoxically, complete
withdrawal of U.S. NSNWs from Europe might
be regarded in Moscow as less than a positive development
because it would force Russia to do something,
while the domestic lineup is clearly in favor of doing
nothing. It seems that Moscow would be satisfied if
the current international debate on NSNWs comes to
naught, as have previous discussions of the topic. One
is forced to question the very existence of any Russian
interest in the issue of U.S. NSNWs in Europe that
could be leveraged by the United States <strong>and</strong> <strong>NATO</strong>.
Given that situation in Moscow, prospects for
control, reduction, <strong>and</strong>/or transparency of NSNWs
appear bleak. Of late, the Russian military has gravi-
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