Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

of old arguments about “defense on the cheap”
reasserting themselves in these conditions. But
in the end, the existing question remains the
same: what deficit needs to be compensated
for? If the only measure of merit is to strike a
“balance” between Russia <strong>and</strong> <strong>NATO</strong>, then
perhaps (1) rumors of the demise of the Cold
War were premature, <strong>and</strong> (2) our fiscal situation
is not so dire after all. Even more importantly,
given the resources already being applied to a
revised threat assessment in the form of a European
missile defense system, it certainly seems
appropriate to apply forces already in the field
to the same end.
• Collateral effect. Components of defense strategy
seem to work best when consistent <strong>and</strong> complementary.
U.S. conventional forces have long
since been reoriented from a focus on a heavy
central European campaign to flexible contingencies
in the Mideast, Southwest or Northeast
Asia, or elsewhere. A ballistic missile defense
initiative at the center of present European collaborative
defense efforts aims to counter prospective
Mideast threats. If such core concepts
as the continuity of the deterrence escalation
ladder continue to apply, then a corresponding
reorientation of NSNW assets to align with the
strategy underpinning these conventional <strong>and</strong>
missile-defense initiatives certainly seems an
appropriate next (if not antecedent) step.
• Spillover effect. It is a well-worn diplomatic
principle that arms control (<strong>and</strong> other diplomatic)
successes can generate momentum in related
deliberations. They may sometimes supply
direct or indirect trade-offs to help balance
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