Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

The United Kingdom.
The UK’s independent nuclear deterrent has always
been committed to <strong>NATO</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the UK has been
consistently supportive of firm language on <strong>NATO</strong>’s
nuclear posture. It is a reasonable assumption that
this position will continue. Conservative governments
have normally adopted what could be termed a robust
approach to the question of defense, including
the retention of the nuclear deterrent. The renewal of
the Trident system provides an interesting backdrop
to <strong>NATO</strong>’s discussions. British officials note that in
the DDPR discussions, they may well find themselves
as the “honest broker” trying to find middle ground
between the conflicting views of France <strong>and</strong> Germany
on the significance of disarmament. 6
France.
French nuclear forces have always been independent
of <strong>NATO</strong>, <strong>and</strong> France has stayed outside all
discussions of <strong>NATO</strong>’s nuclear weapons. However,
French officials do participate in the drafting of language
on <strong>NATO</strong> strategic policy in key documents.
Despite its return to <strong>NATO</strong>’s defense planning <strong>and</strong>
military structures <strong>and</strong> to <strong>NATO</strong>’s defense planning
system for conventional forces, France remains outside
the High Level Group (HLG) <strong>and</strong> the <strong>Nuclear</strong>
Planning Group (NPG). This means that French officials
are present at the discussion of general strategic
guidance in the NAC with all 28 members, but absent
from more detailed discussions <strong>and</strong> consultations on
nuclear policy in the HLG <strong>and</strong> NPG which meet with
27 members. The Declaration accompanying the Strategic
Concept adopted in Lisbon explicitly states that
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