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Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

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c<strong>on</strong>tribute approximately 37,000 of the 130,000 troops<br />

(including some 90,000 Americans) in the Internati<strong>on</strong>al<br />

Security Assistance Force (ISAF). European,<br />

Canadian, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> American leaders broadly agree that,<br />

if Afghanistan were to become a failed state, terrorist<br />

networks would reestablish themselves there, posing<br />

an increased threat to European <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> American interests.<br />

But for some Allies, a desire to dem<strong>on</strong>strate solidarity<br />

with the United States (to ensure, am<strong>on</strong>g other<br />

things, that American commitments to European security<br />

remain str<strong>on</strong>g) has motivated their participati<strong>on</strong><br />

in ISAF as much, if not more, than any perceived<br />

threat emanating from Afghanistan itself. Not surprisingly,<br />

public support for the ISAF missi<strong>on</strong> is generally<br />

lower <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> eroding faster in Europe than in the United<br />

States, where memories of September 11, 2001 (9/11),<br />

remain sharp. Moreover, the precarious situati<strong>on</strong> in<br />

Pakistan could heighten fricti<strong>on</strong> am<strong>on</strong>g the Allies, especially<br />

if some c<strong>on</strong>clude that U.S. pressure against<br />

extremist sanctuaries is hindering more than helping<br />

chances for an orderly withdrawal from Afghanistan<br />

with or without a regi<strong>on</strong>al settlement.<br />

Differing threat percepti<strong>on</strong>s surrounded <str<strong>on</strong>g>NATO</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s<br />

role in Libya, as well. Germany’s abstenti<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> United<br />

Nati<strong>on</strong>s (UN) Security Council Resoluti<strong>on</strong> 1973 (2011),<br />

which authorized member states to take “all necessary<br />

measures” to protect Libyan civilians, roiled its relati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

with many Allies—especially the United States,<br />

France, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> the United Kingdom (UK). 2 While Germany<br />

subsequently joined the <str<strong>on</strong>g>NATO</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>sensus to launch<br />

military operati<strong>on</strong>s pursuant to Resoluti<strong>on</strong> 1973, the<br />

Merkel government’s decisi<strong>on</strong> to withdraw German<br />

crews from <str<strong>on</strong>g>NATO</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s Airborne Warning <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> C<strong>on</strong>trol<br />

System aircraft participating in Operati<strong>on</strong> UNIFIED<br />

PROTECTOR signaled Berlin’s desire to distance it-<br />

361

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