Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

Of course, the evolving European position on the
provision of missile defenses for the Alliance will have
a bearing on how nuclear weapons fit into the portfolio
of defense <strong>and</strong> deterrence options. The issue over
the extent to which these options were alternative or
complementary approaches was part of the discussion
from early on in the debate. Positions on this issue are
likely to evolve as the missile defense architecture in
<strong>and</strong> around Europe starts to mature. Clearly, all the
potential sensitivities surrounding this discussion are
mixed up with lingering concerns about the Alliance’s
adaptability <strong>and</strong> continuing relevance more broadly,
or else the <strong>NATO</strong> approach to the matter up to now
would have been more categorical <strong>and</strong> confident.
Might <strong>NATO</strong> have avoided some of the potential
pitfalls if it had been more transparent historically
about the enduring role of nuclear weapons in
its arsenal in Europe? Clearly it suited the Alliance to
deemphasize that role over a long period, indeed not
to talk about the weapons at all, <strong>and</strong> that is in part
responsible for the low level of public awareness <strong>and</strong>
underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the matter now. A greater continuity
of debate might have made the dilemmas now less
acute. The actual state of affairs is such that whatever
arrangement <strong>NATO</strong> chooses for now is likely to provoke
some degree of controversy, with or without a
continuing role for the U.S. B-61 bombs.
The reality that Germany, a salient Alliance voice,
appears to have retreated from its initial position is
perhaps the most significant element in shaping how
<strong>NATO</strong> will proceed. As well as second thoughts on
the issue itself, it now has its h<strong>and</strong>s full with a host
of other more pressing problems. Bonn now seems to
have settled on accepting <strong>NATO</strong>’s identity as a nuclear
alliance, but without requiring nuclear weapons on
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