Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

last until 2015, modern armaments in our army must
comprise no less than 30% while this figure must increase
to 70% by 2020. . . . 19
Such long-term growth in hardware is very expensive
overall <strong>and</strong> has to be evaluated within the context
of expected declines in Russian gross domestic product
(GDP), as projected by the Bank of Finl<strong>and</strong>, which
sees a growth of 5 percent in 2012, down from 8.1 percent
in 2007. 20 Five percent growth is still good, especially
in comparison with the anemic growth rates of
western nations, <strong>and</strong> should provide some margin at
least for the military to grow more quickly—but it will
dem<strong>and</strong> sacrifices in other areas of the budget.
In fact, of all categories in the projected budget that
are scheduled to grow between 2011 <strong>and</strong> 2013, only
two, defense <strong>and</strong> debt servicing, are scheduled to increase
their share of gross domestic product (GDP).
Debt servicing is scheduled to increase from 1.8 to 1.9
percent of GDP in that period, <strong>and</strong> defense from 2.9 to
3.3 percent: in other words, defense will increase by
nearly 14 percent <strong>and</strong> debt servicing by 5.6 percent. All
other broad budget categories—including health care,
social measures, <strong>and</strong> education—would suffer declines
as a percentage of GDP, <strong>and</strong> most (except social
policy) will experience absolute declines in funding.
These figures can be interpreted to mean that military
spending is scheduled to gain strength in the Russian
economy after a lapse <strong>and</strong> that, if the plan works out,
by 2020 Russia will have what it wants in military
hardware—possibly the necessary precision-guided
munitions to take the place of NSNWs. Such an eventuality
will likely affect Russian negotiating positions
in any talks directed at the reduction of NSNWs.
186