Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

esponse: without it, the Allies were unlikely to agree
in peacetime over the role <strong>and</strong> timing of TNW use.
Here, Sir Michael Quinn describes the tactic of deliberate
ambiguity:
<strong>NATO</strong>’s public declarations were carefully worded
for Soviet consumption. . . . We rightly believed Soviet
intelligence would obtain accounts of the policy discussions
that had taken place behind closed doors, so
we tried to ensure that two key messages got through
to Moscow—first, <strong>NATO</strong> had faced up to the tough
issues of nuclear use; <strong>and</strong> second, <strong>NATO</strong> would not
take provocative or hasty action. 68
General Hans Steyning von S<strong>and</strong>rart, Comm<strong>and</strong>er
of <strong>NATO</strong> Central Front, elaborated: “We had one great
advantage. . . . Despite all its knowledge of <strong>NATO</strong>, the
Soviet General Staff could never be certain of the exact
circumstances in which we would ‘go nuclear’ for the
simple reason that the members of <strong>NATO</strong> themselves
did not know.” 69 The convenient official formulation
was to say that <strong>NATO</strong> would use TNWs “as late as
possible, but as early as necessary.” 70 This was deterrence
as much by default as design. 71
Creation of the <strong>NATO</strong> <strong>Nuclear</strong> Planning Group.
The <strong>Nuclear</strong> Planning Group (NPG) grew out of
the McNamara Special Committee on <strong>Nuclear</strong> Consultation
in 1965-56. 72 Its major prospective advantage
was Soviet acquiescence. The Soviet Union had
indicated that, unlike its strenuous objections to Germany’s
membership in the MLF, Moscow would not
object to Germany’s accessing nuclear decisionmaking
through the NPG, <strong>and</strong> would therefore not use
this issue to block negotiations on the <strong>Nuclear</strong> Non-
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