Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

not reached a clear consensus on what these weapons
are now for, whether <strong>and</strong> how they might be retained
or even modernized, or why <strong>and</strong> in what manner they
might be dispensed with—unilaterally or through
negotiation—would be seriously disadvantaged, <strong>and</strong>
could find events <strong>and</strong> opinion spinning rapidly out
of its control. Certainly, in a situation in which consciousness
of <strong>and</strong> attachment to the continued presence
of nuclear weapons in Europe has been slight,
reporting of any public debate will inevitably latch on
to what remain, at this stage anyway, some awkward
paradoxes <strong>and</strong> inconsistencies in the arguments surrounding
these weapons.
A large part of the problem for <strong>NATO</strong> is that the
status quo appears unsustainable for anything more
than the very short to medium term because of the
obsolescence of the weapons <strong>and</strong> the dual-capable
aircraft (DCA) that are assigned to carry them. However,
any initiative to try to change that status quo
risks shining that oh-so-unpredictable public spotlight
on the matter. Some within <strong>NATO</strong> who back retention
of the nuclear capability argue that, with a bit of deft
strategic communication to prepare the ground <strong>and</strong>
opinion, it might be possible to finesse this problem.
But this is probably a forlorn hope when it is not clear
what the message will be, or even to whom it should
chiefly be aimed.
The lessons of the debate over missile defense as
it evolved in Europe illustrate the difficulties of framing
a case for even a relatively modest future capability
when there is instinctive popular suspicion
<strong>and</strong> skepticism, no consensus or agreed perspective
around Europe, <strong>and</strong> an opportunity for Russia to sow
division through hostility <strong>and</strong> opposition—feigned or
real. Admittedly, the George H. W. Bush administra-
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