Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

majority of Russians (even those opposed to Putin/
Medvedev government) think today. Among broad
sections of the public <strong>and</strong> elite, the late 1980s <strong>and</strong> the
1990s are associated with unreciprocated concessions
that actually undermined the interests <strong>and</strong> security of
the Soviet Union <strong>and</strong> later Russia. Proponents of this
view cite the enlargement of <strong>NATO</strong> <strong>and</strong> the refusal
of the United States to include navies under the Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty as examples
of Western perfidy. Russians also turn the argument
around, saying there is no justification for even a limited
number of U.S. TNWs in Europe since <strong>NATO</strong> is
much more powerful than Russia—these weapons
should have been withdrawn.
Within this dominant political framework, therefore,
any Russian advantage, no matter how illusory,
should be either preserved or exchanged for Western
concessions in areas of interest to Russia. Furthermore,
persistent attempts to persuade Russia to reduce its
TNWs or at least disclose their location, numbers, <strong>and</strong>
other information, tend to be regarded with reflexive
suspicion, without serious thought about the reasoning
behind the proposals. Instead, such attempts are
seen as “proof” that these weapons are truly valuable.
Hence, the “asking price” rises even higher. The bottom
line is simple: Russia will likely turn deaf ears to
Western entreaties on its NSNWs under any foreseeable
leadership configuration whether Putin-Medvedev,
Putin, Medvedev, or any realistically electable
member of the opposition.
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