Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

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“not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT <strong>and</strong> in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.” See “<strong>Nuclear</strong> Posture Review Report,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 2010, page 27, available from www.defense.gov/npr/ docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.<strong>pdf</strong>, p. 15. 38. This possibility is discussed in Karl-Heinz Kamp, “<strong>NATO</strong>’s <strong>Nuclear</strong> Posture Review: <strong>Nuclear</strong> Sharing Instead of <strong>Nuclear</strong> Stationing,” Research Paper, Rome, Italy: <strong>NATO</strong> Defence College, May 2011, p. 68. 299
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***** Comments pertaining to this r
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6. Aspects of the Current Russian P
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21. Arms Control after START ......
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this incredible amount of destructi
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hundreds of U.S. weapons (a
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TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND <stron
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Security was an additional problem.
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embraced lessons learned from the 1
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I learned here of some of the deep
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CHAPTER 1 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT Ri
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as just another kind of military op
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it, the Allies were unlikely to agr
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• Assets for future arms control
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ments are dissimilar. Whereas Europ
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CHAPTER 2 TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
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ombs in Europe as strategic weapons
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experiences of war, in a less moral
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Strangelovian image for NAT
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II. 1953-1963. U.S. STRATEGIC SUPER
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• For what political purposes mig
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widely heralded move to flexible re
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clear sentiment for the Alliance <s
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Nevertheless, Germany underst<stron
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first in order to break up his forc
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saw Pact lines to interdict strateg
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The Democratic People’s Republic
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given release authority by the Sovi
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III. 1963-1967. EMERGING DOUBTS CON
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esponse: without it, the Allies wer
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ous arms control groups argue that
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Why Did NATO Keep
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France were equipped with nuclear w
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slowly changing deterrence ethos wa
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through widespread protests, openly
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although it decided that the remain
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e concealed by the regular annual <
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However, concerned by the post-Viet
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ously create a public and</
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ers have repeatedly reemphasized th
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judged to generate (but which may n
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5. “The position we have reached
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24. Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructe
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49. Catherine McArdle Kelleher, “
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76. Joseph F. Pilat and</st
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100. Corroborated by Catherine Kell
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CHAPTER 3 U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLI
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the North Atlantic Treaty Organizat
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delivery exercised a dominant influ
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conventional strength. 14 In the Pa
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the capability to employ such weapo
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ground-launched short-range nuclear
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curity policy in Asia, and<
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lies. 31 At the strategic a
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mediate postwar period. Washington
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ons throughout the Cold War <strong
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These shifts are the products both
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power and the prol
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7. Robert S. Norris et al., “Wher
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frey A. Larsen and
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near Central Europe and</st
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47. Available from armedservices.ho
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CHAPTER 4 RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES ON T
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Russian Navy would be particularly
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ers to produce income from Russian
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3. These are the results of polls o
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TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE FE
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Russia’s anticipated spending of
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arms race was on, and</stro
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heads; and improve
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national security strategy. Current
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On April 23, 1999, Viktor Nikolaevi
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First of all, the word “obligatio
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By 2004, a young scholar, Aleksei F
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time, it seems to believe that, in
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ence as the chief factor that limit
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their modernization as a response.
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in areas affecting Russian national
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armed struggle at sea for the perio
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centric warfare. Citing both Chines
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tation to maintain security <strong
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PROSPECTS FOR A U.S.-RUSSIAN TREATY
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uild a missile defense system in so
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10. “Ktokhitree: Mir vstupil v er
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36. Sergei Karaganov “Global Zero
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CHAPTER 6 ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT RU
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NATO countries. Du
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allistic missile defense (BMD), <st
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Meanwhile, the factor of China (wit
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Today, in fact, only the nuclear um
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By the same logic, preventing a pot
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diminishes still further Russian in
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1989 —April 12 SHORT-RANGE NUCLEA
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where Russian interest is higher th
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6. Kozin, “Five obstacles.” 7.
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CHAPTER 7 INFLUENCES ON RUSSIAN POL
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general and its ow
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are show of unanimity from nearly a
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ally; it is just that others are ac
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to direct Russian toward multilater
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armor, like T-62 tanks and<
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Reducing Non-Strategic Nucl
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The Russian inventory has been redu
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Under present conditions, the range
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Ws should be multilateral, with the
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continue the practice of conducting
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the General Staff Nikolai Makarov o
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CHAPTER 8 RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES ON N
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Yet these concerns are most likely
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Bush and Mikhail G
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anyone’s guess. As mentioned abov
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STRATEGY Russian NSNWs attracted in
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lored damage” (zadannyi ushcherb)
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intrigue pertaining to nuclear weap
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eaching political, military, <stron
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Inertia. The longer this position i
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In a similar vein, the Foreign Mini
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THE RUSSIAN NSNW POSITION: LIMITS A
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tated to what it calls an “integr
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8 1. “Zayavlen
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13. The 12th Main Department of the
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PART III EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 227
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ope is illustrative of a more funda
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maintaining these weapons or their
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CHAPTER 10 THE ROLE AND PLACE OF TA
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positions, preoccupations,
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cohesion and solid
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ferred to by the now familiar term
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The second track is an effort to de
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The United States. The traditional
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the nuclear discussions apply only
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Page 283 and 284: mer Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chie
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Page 289 and 290: that the debate on a nuclear-free w
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Page 297 and 298: 9. See Miles A. Pomper, William Pot
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Page 307 and 308: DIFFERING THREAT ASSESSMENTS AND AL
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Page 339 and 340: Of course, the evolving European po
Page 341 and 342: ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 13 1. The author
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Page 352 and 353: ons for their ostensible military v
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States and the oth
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sure U.S. allies and</stron
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and Steven Pifer e
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and nuclear forces
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42. For representative arguments ab
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CHAPTER 16 NATO’
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contribute approximately 37,000 of
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with NATO (for exa
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time or offensive missions. A top F
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ingly precious funds on behalf of n
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their national interests so dictate
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whether the resources necessary to
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accounts of deployed American weapo
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While many disarmament advocates se
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nership, Russian military doctrine
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ar arsenal due to concerns over oth
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Gates also recognized, however, tha
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The United States Is the Only Major
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cussed above. Indeed, the very conc
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emoving European-based U.S. nuclear
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At the November 2010 Lisbon summit,
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in their roles fulfilling high read
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of the last century; “There [can]
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with a posture that lowers the risk
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5. Thomas Grove, “Analysis: Russi
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available from www.nato.int/cps/en/
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CHAPTER 18 TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
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several fronts. However, the sheer
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sional context as the important foc
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exaggerated emphasis on security in
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ployed strategic warheads. The INF
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der programs of cooperation, the Be
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on its nuclear warheads in Europe <
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2011, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavro
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General Arms Control Considerations
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inspection regime—which neither s
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Poles remain wary of past suggestio
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negotiate. While some U.S. official
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tage, since the United States has n
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confirm that warheads were not remo
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conventional force cuts. In the Mut
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 19 1. The Russia
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18. See, for example, Pavel Podvig,
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ief overview of current themes of c
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It seems fair to observe that where
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turn out to be inconsistent with mi
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widely understood to rely on CFE de
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Mobility. Are modern forces suffici
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trations of forces led to the origi
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By the same token, an NSNW regime i
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of old arguments about “defense o
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deployment and for
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the previous rationale for deployme
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in its interest for NATO</s
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to develop, however, the form in wh
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atify a treaty that would place leg
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exercises near each other’s terri
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This suggests that, if Russian lead
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here may be as much as can be expec
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they to be combined with commitment
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Europe and East As
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ole in pushing for United Nations (
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CHAPTER 22 THE CONVENTIONAL AND NUC
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sequently ratified by the United St
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ison to the Soviet Union an
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on resolving the long dilemma over
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Treaty Limited Equipment Group Limi
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It was exacerbated by Russian milit
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phasized that the 1997 NATO
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In response, NATO
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“host nation consent” for stati
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participating parties at 29 (absent
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and security-build
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United States and
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a detailed discussion of the state
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30. Committee on International Secu
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CHAPTER 23 SUMMING UP AND ISSUES FO
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States and its all
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ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS JAMES A. BLA
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DORN CRAWFORD, Lieutenant Colonel,
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transatlantic defense and</
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egional security developments relat
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