Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

is the relationship between them that is critical. Thus,
for example, all three <strong>NATO</strong> nuclear weapon states
recently announced the total size of their nuclear
weapon stockpiles (France in 2008, the United States
<strong>and</strong> United Kingdom [UK] in 2010). In each case, these
transparency announcements were accompanied by
commitments to make further reductions (in the cases
of France <strong>and</strong> the UK) or confirmation of large recent
reductions (in the case of the United States).
This is a good model for future transparency announcements.
<strong>NATO</strong> is therefore right to ask Russia
to announce the total size of its arsenal, following the
example of France, the United States, <strong>and</strong> the UK. But
it would not be a confidence-building step were Russia
to announce the size of its nuclear arsenal without
any accompanying promises of reductions. If such an
announcement were to confirm that Russia’s arsenal
was bigger than that of the United States, moreover,
it could be seen as an act of defiance, reinforcing the
perception that Russia is unwilling to enter into a serious
process of trust-building.
While transparency on its own is therefore a mixed
blessing, it does play a critical role in reinforcing the
value of reductions that do take place. The decisions
made by the UK <strong>and</strong> France to publicize the size of
their arsenals, despite the lack of any accompanying
verification, has enabled them to gain credit for the
substantial post-Cold War reductions that both have
made. By contrast, one of the reasons for the lack of
follow-on to the 1991 U.S./Russia Presidential <strong>Nuclear</strong>
Initiatives (authorizing large reductions in tactical
nuclear arsenals in both countries) was Russia’s
failure to provide sufficient confirmation (such as relevant
stockpile numbers) that it had fulfilled its own
commitments.
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