Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

ceived as subordinate to the more relevant objective of
maintaining <strong>NATO</strong>’s stability <strong>and</strong> cohesion. As such,
<strong>and</strong> because intermediate options between maintaining
TNWs <strong>and</strong> withdrawing them completely are not
easy to envisage, 34 a final decision on nuclear forward
deployment can be temporarily postponed. 35
In this respect, the position of Italy on the presence,
role, <strong>and</strong> destiny of the U.S. TNWs on its soil
is telling <strong>and</strong> exemplifies the general perspective of
<strong>NATO</strong> Europe on the issue. 36 On the one h<strong>and</strong>, Italy
has dramatically devalued TNWs <strong>and</strong> considers the
transatlantic link strong, regardless of the presence of
a few B-61 bombs. On the other, with its deeply rooted
strategic culture that prioritizes multilateralism over
every form of unilateralism, Italy continues to assign
paramount value to the cohesion of <strong>NATO</strong>, seeking
to prevent rifts that could compromise its solidarity.
To that end, Rome is willing to slow down or postpone
the elimination of tactical weapons from its territory
if necessary, although it considers these weapons
not only of little intrinsic significance but also a hindrance
to the program of nuclear disarmament that it
supports.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, the military <strong>and</strong> political value of
U.S. tactical nuclear forward deployment in Europe
has dramatically decreased. Most <strong>NATO</strong> members
genuinely support global nuclear disarmament <strong>and</strong>
are amenable, in principle, to further reductions in the
number of TNWs, <strong>and</strong> even to their complete withdrawal.
However, some <strong>NATO</strong> members—particularly
the new members in CEE—continue to attribute residual
symbolic significance to TNWs, with the result
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