Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

security concerns <strong>and</strong> prospects for cooperation. One
step the Russians conspicuously did not take in the
course of their CFE “suspension” was to discontinue
participation in the Treaty’s Joint Consultative Group,
which meets weekly in Vienna to discuss Treaty-related
concerns <strong>and</strong> seek solutions. Analogous bodies
associated with VDoc <strong>and</strong> Open Skies provide similar
consultative venues. The verification centers that conduct
implementation activities for all three regimes
foster extensive working-level contacts <strong>and</strong> dialogue
as well.
These are all st<strong>and</strong>ard mechanisms associated with
arms control agreements, so it is reasonable to assume
than an NSNW accommodation would include similar
provisions for implementation <strong>and</strong> consultation.
Not drivers of the “reset,” to be sure, but vehicles to
exploit <strong>and</strong> facilitate it.
THREADS, SEAMS, AND GAPS
Overlaying a conventional arms control template
on a dialogue about the role <strong>and</strong> disposition of
NSNWs is an exercise in exploring potential threads
of continuity <strong>and</strong> discontinuity, <strong>and</strong> considering lessons
<strong>and</strong> leverages that might improve prospects for
a successful outcome. From this perspective, a number
of influences seem apparent. What happens with
NSNWs has a:
• Substitution effect. The roots of NSNWs have
commonly been traced to efforts to overcome
deficits in conventional forces—initially by
<strong>NATO</strong>, more recently by Russia. In an environment
of mounting fiscal constraints <strong>and</strong> fragile
economies, this logic may seem, if anything, to
be growing in force. Certainly there is the risk
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