Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

Inertia.
The longer this position is maintained, the more
entrenched it becomes. The key elements of the current
Russian position have remained unchanged for
over a decade. Changing it without manifestly cogent
reasons might seem to the other party to be an unjustified
concession. Such a dynamic can be changed only
with a radical leadership change (as happened when
Gorbachev assumed the highest office in the Soviet
Union) or with a sea change in the environment. Neither
is present or appears on the horizon today.
“CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING”
The Russian elite, including the military leadership,
acutely feels the uncertainty of the international
environment. The main threat is still associated with
the United States <strong>and</strong> its allies, but other potential
threats are emerging (China in particular), <strong>and</strong> the
Russian military is reluctant to part with any assets
it has at its disposal. In 2005-07, similar arguments
were made in favor of Russia’s withdrawal from the
Intermediate Range <strong>Nuclear</strong> Forces (INF) Treaty, rationalized
by the possession or impending development
of intermediate-range missiles by “other states.”
Although specific states were never mentioned, the
culprits were obvious—China, India, Pakistan, Israel,
Iran, <strong>and</strong> perhaps even North Korea. What emerged
was the concept of “capabilities-based planning,”
which favors maintenance of all available assets as
insurance against unforeseen (<strong>and</strong> unforeseeable)
threats.
Moreover, Russian efforts to develop a modern
conventional capability have been very slow <strong>and</strong>
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