Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

has a different set of critical qualitative characteristics
associated with it. As the U.S. stockpile gets smaller,
both in terms of actual numbers as well as in the variety
of warhead types remaining, it will behoove U.S.
arms control negotiators <strong>and</strong> force planners to tread
carefully when it comes to radical changes or reductions,
as the adverse ripple effects on h<strong>and</strong>ling future
threats or responsibilities may be severe. 52
CONCLUSION
As President Obama observed in his strategic guidance
to the U.S. military on January 5, 2012, “Our nation
is at a moment of transition.” 53 He was referring
to the end of the Iraq War <strong>and</strong> budgetary issues, but
his observation was equally true for the coming decisions
the United States will have to make regarding its
remaining non-strategic nuclear forces. The primary
missions of the U.S. armed forces will continue to include
deterring <strong>and</strong> defeating aggression, <strong>and</strong> must
therefore be “capable of denying the objectives of—or
imposing unacceptable costs on—an opportunistic aggressor.”
54 While this mission can be conducted using
various types of military force, the language of “unacceptable
costs” has for three generations served as
code for “nuclear weapons.” Another of the military’s
continuing missions will thus be to maintain a safe,
secure, <strong>and</strong> effective nuclear deterrent. As the 2010
NPR, 2011 <strong>NATO</strong> Strategic Concept, <strong>and</strong> 2012 Strategic
Guidance have all declared:
As long as nuclear weapons remain in existence, the
United States will maintain a safe, secure, <strong>and</strong> effective
arsenal . . . that can under any circumstances confront
an adversary with the prospect of unacceptable
damage, both to deter potential adversaries <strong>and</strong> to as-
350