Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

who occasionally address other theaters that may be
of interest to the United States). This perspective <strong>and</strong>
its underlying threat assessment yield little room for
forward thinking about current <strong>and</strong> projected military
requirements.
Is there a credible case to be made for NSNWs
that does not rely on a Cold War, East-West calculus?
Certainly the efforts expended on Mideast scenarios
to urge the fielding of a European theater missile defense
system (<strong>and</strong>, for that matter, <strong>NATO</strong> out-of-area
conventional operations) suggest that there should be
such a case, provided only that a retaliatory component
remains an essential element of a robust deterrence
strategy. If so, we should be recasting our conversation
about the continuing role of these weapons
in these terms; if not, we should be seeking expedient
means to reduce or eliminate them.
By the same token, we can <strong>and</strong> should reject Russian
arguments that co-opt the onetime <strong>NATO</strong> posture
of using NSNWs to compensate for conventional
disadvantage. As amusing as such arguments are for
their irony, they rely on the same fundamental premise
of escalation from a massive <strong>NATO</strong> conventional
attack that we have already dismissed in conventional
arms control forums, as much for its laughability as
for its quaintness.
Sovereignty.
What rules <strong>and</strong> limits should apply to the stationing
of forces outside national territory? Inside? Complementary
issues of what constraints are appropriate on
where forces may be located have occupied much of
the conventional arms control dialogue. On the one
h<strong>and</strong>, the principle of inhibiting threatening concen-
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