Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

where Russian interest is higher than Western.…A
package of agreements on TNW-CFE-BMD may be
promising in order for deep strategic substance to fill
the Russian idea about a new architecture of Euro-Atlantic
security, which so far remains “the shell without
the filling.” 20
Whatever the logic in linking negotiations about
TNWs with other issues, in some way Russia may be
setting a kind of trap for itself. Ironically, by connecting
the TNW issue to so many different problems,
Russia could forfeit the leverage they confer. That is,
when trying to negotiate these other concerns, Russians
could hear in response western insistence on discussing
TNWs as a precondition for the others.
CONCLUSIONS
Analysis of the current Russian perspective on
TNWs suggests that the issue of trust between Russia,
on one h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the United States <strong>and</strong> <strong>NATO</strong>,
on the other, is still very much at stake. The Russian
dem<strong>and</strong> for a U.S. nuclear withdrawal from Europe
may be packaged as an attempt to achieve a more
equal position before the start of negotiations <strong>and</strong>
even to squeeze out a greater return for their future
concessions. Many Western politicians <strong>and</strong> commentators,
however, see it more as an attempt to further
isolate America from Europe by driving a wedge between
the United States <strong>and</strong> leading regional powers
like Germany, Italy, <strong>and</strong> the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s. The West is
thus attempting to persuade Russia, if not to formalize
the TNW reduction process, at least to increase the
transparency of Russian TNW-related issues <strong>and</strong> the
stakes involved. Many Russians, in their turn, see this
attempt as one more ploy for undermining Russian
positions in Europe <strong>and</strong> the world.
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