Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

If the wider concerns of those countries regarding
the allied commitment to their defense can be suitably
addressed, progress on further reduction in the
numbers of TNWs <strong>and</strong> on softening <strong>NATO</strong>’s nuclear
posture might be possible. 37 In the final analysis, one
cannot exclude the possibility that a properly tailored
<strong>and</strong> strengthened “Asian model” of extended deterrence,
whereby the U.S. nuclear umbrella can continue
to function credibly without forward basing, could, in
principle, be applicable to the European context. 38
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 12
1. According to <strong>NATO</strong>, the readiness posture of dual-capable
aircraft (DCA) has been greatly reduced since the mid-1990s, from
minutes to weeks. In 2002, the readiness requirements for these
aircraft were further reduced <strong>and</strong> are now measured in months.
See <strong>NATO</strong>, “<strong>NATO</strong>’s <strong>Nuclear</strong> Forces in the New Security Environment,”
January 24, 2008, available from www.nato.int/nato_
static/assets/<strong>pdf</strong>/<strong>pdf</strong>_topics/20091022_<strong>Nuclear</strong>_Forces_in_the_New_
Security_Environment-eng.<strong>pdf</strong>.
2. Speech by Guido Westerwelle at the 46th Munich Security
Conference, February 6, 2010, available from www.security
conference.de. Similarly, Willy Claes, former Belgian Foreign Minister
<strong>and</strong> former <strong>NATO</strong> Secretary General, stated, “The Cold War
is over.…US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe have lost all military
importance.” See “Ex-<strong>NATO</strong> chief joins call for no US nuclear
arms in Europe,” Agence France Presse, February 19, 2010, available
from www.spacewar.com/afp/100219103611.ezoyfew3.html.
3. <strong>Tactical</strong> <strong>Nuclear</strong> <strong>Weapons</strong> (TNWs) are designed to perform
specific military functions that support operations on the ground.
They are intended for use in combat to achieve circumscribed
(i.e., tactical) objectives in a limited nuclear war. With regard to
<strong>NATO</strong>, the “flexible response” doctrine that was introduced in
the 1960s foresaw the use of TNWs on European battlegrounds to
counter Soviet conventional superiority <strong>and</strong> hamper or halt a Red
Army advance on allied territory. The definition of TNWs <strong>and</strong> the
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